The Design of Capital Income Taxation: Reflections on the Mirrlees Review by Keuschnigg, Christian
 
School of Economics and Political Science, 
Department of Economics 
University of St. Gallen 












  The Design of Capital Income Taxation: 
Reflections on the Mirrlees Review 
   
  Christian Keuschnigg 
   




Editor:  Martina Flockerzi 
University of St. Gallen 
School of Economics and Political Science 
Department of Economics 
Varnbüelstrasse 19 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  +41 71 224 23 25 
Fax  +41 71 224 31 35 








School of Economics and Political Science 
Department of Economics 
University of St. Gallen 
Varnbüelstrasse 19 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  +41 71 224 23 25 




















   
 
The Design of Capital Income Taxation: 


















Author’s address:  Prof. Christian Keuschnigg 
FGN-HSG 
Varnbüelstrasse 19 
9000 St. Gallen 
Phone   +41 71 224 30 85 
Fax  +41 71 224 28 74 
Email  christian.keuschnigg@unisg.ch 
Website www.fgn.unisg.ch  
 
Abstract 
This commentary reflects on the recommendations of the Mirrlees Review on tax reform 
with a special focus on capital income taxation. Regarding the alternatives of moving to a 
consumption based tax system, the commentary discusses the relative merits of choosing an 
ACE system (allowance for corporate equity) rather than a cash-flow tax on the company 
level. It reviews the arguments in favour of full elimination of tax on the normal return to 
savings  at  the  personal  level  which  contrasts  with  alternative  tax  reform  proposals 
recommending  a  positive  but  low  and  flat  tax  rate  on  personal  capital  income.  It  also 
discusses how existing computational models would have to be extended for a meaningful 
quantification of the gains and costs of implementing a tax reform along the lines of the 
Mirrlees Review. 
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1.  Introduction 
Reviewing a fundamental tax reform proposal such as 'Tax by Design' of the 
Mirrlees Review (see Mirrlees, 2011, and the background studies with comments 
in Mirrless, 2010) is a daunting task. Economists usually ask how a specific tax 
reform  scores  with  respect  to  the  following  criteria:  simplicity,  fairness  and 
efficiency. Simplicity requires that the tax code is transparent, easy to understand, 
simple to administer by tax authorities, and involves low compliance costs of the 
private sector. Simplicity hinges more on the rules that define the tax base, rather 
than the rate structure. With few exceptions to general rules, Tax By Design is 
probably a significant step towards simplicity. Quantitative studies usually fail to 
capture  the  economic  gains  and  costs  of  simplicity.  So  it  remains  difficult  to 
evaluate  the  relative  importance  of  simplicity  in  an  overall  evaluation  of  tax 
reform. Fairness relates to how taxes and other forms of government intervention 
change the income and wealth distribution. The desired degree of redistribution 
reflects value judgements. However, it is widely agreed that the relative ranking of 
households should not be turned around by the tax transfer mechanism. The abrupt 
phasing out of social benefits and the uncoordinated nature of the social insurance 
system and the income tax schedule can and often do lead to unintended and unfair 
changes in relative income positions that grossly violate redistributive objectives. 
Tax By Design follows an integrated and systemic approach in designing the tax 
transfer mechanism by considering the redistributive effects of  the system as a 
whole,  including  the  induced  changes  in  pre-tax  income  resulting  from  the 
behavioural response of households and firms. It should thus lead to significant 
improvements with respect to fairness. Finally, efficiency requires that raising tax 
revenue needed to finance government activity should not introduce new avoidable 
distortions that impose costs on the private sector larger than the volume of tax 
revenue extracted. Usually, efficiency calls for a low excess burden, with some 
modification in the presence of externalities. Efficiency considerations have been, 
of course, a major driver in the design of this radical tax reform proposal.  
The  'optimality'  of  a  tax  system  is  not  compatible  with  a  one-size-fits-all 
approach. Countries differ by the degree of openness, the sector composition as 
well as skill and R&D intensity of production, the quality of financial and legal 
institutions,  the  reliance  of  production  on  entrepreneurship,  the  riskiness  of 
employment relationships, the age structure of the population, and other aspects. 
These characteristics not only determine the degree of inequality in the pre-tax 
distribution of income and wealth, but also make some behavioural adjustment 
mechanisms  more  important  than  others.  One  might  expect  that  the  equity 
efficiency trade-off in designing the tax transfer system differs across countries. 
Furthermore, the historical evolution of real world tax systems is probably shaped 
more by political economy forces rather than an optimal policy approach.  Given 
different political institutions, countries have ended up with rather different tax CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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systems and, hence, differ significantly with respect to 'initial conditions' for policy 
reform.
1 Depending on initial conditions and country characteristics, the  Tax By 
Design  proposal  might  be  (economically)  more  suitable  and  (politically)  more 
feasible for some countries than for others. 
Given its comprehensive nature and the radical departures from existing tax 
practice, implementing such a proposal is surely a formidable and maybe even too 
challenging  political  project.  The  net  gains  from  reform  should  be  substantial, 
should materialize rather sooner than later, and should be expected with reasonable 
certainty if there is any chance to overcome unavoidable political obstacles. Given 
the  short-sightedness  of  the  political  process,  a  particular  problem  is  that 
adjustment  costs  tend  to  emerge  instantaneously  while  efficiency  gains  fully 
materialize only in the long-run after a prolonged transitional period of behavioural 
adjustment.  This  is  most  evident  in  the  realm  of  capital  income  taxation.  The 
required time period for accumulation of physical and human capital and of private 
asset  wealth  is  measured  more  in  decades  rather  than  years.  So  it  requires 
sophisticated transitional policies to shift forward in time the long-run gains to 
achieve  a  more  balanced  inter-generational  distribution  of  gains  and  losses. 
Moving  from  a  historically  developed  status  quo  towards  a  preferred  new  tax 
system  unavoidably  produces  gainers  and  losers  also  in  an  intra-generational 
perspective. Greater fairness of a new tax system obviously means that a number of 
groups  have  benefited  from  unjustified  tax  privileges  in  the  past  and  will  find 
themselves to be losers compared to the status quo. While this is unavoidable, it 
also creates a political challenge in implementing reform. An attractive 'de novo' 
design of a tax system might not be as attractive anymore if the difficulties of 
moving from initial conditions to the new system and the need for compensating 
potential losers is appropriately taken account of (Feldstein, 1976).  
In  the  following,  I  discuss  and  comment  more  specifically  on  the 
recommendations  of  Tax  By  Design.  Given  the  comprehensive  nature  of  the 
Mirrlees  Review,  this  essay  focuses  primarily  on  capital  income  taxation  and 
discusses other parts of the reform only in a rudimentary way. Section 2 discusses 
the design of capital income taxation at the personal and business level and the 
system's  long-run  neutrality  properties.  Section  3  then  turns  to  possible 
quantification and argues how existing computational problems would have to be 
enriched for a meaningful evaluation of the distributional and efficiency gains of 
the reform. It also discusses the potential transitional problems encountered when 
implementing such a system. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                       
1 Even so close countries like Germany and Switzerland differ substantially in their tax 
and social security system. CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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2.  Capital Income Tax Reform 
The key elements of Tax By Design relating to capital income taxation are (see 
Mirrlees et al., 2011, Table 20.2 for a concise overview): 
(i)  The  normal  return  to  savings  and  investment  is  exempt  from  tax;  A 
stepwise progressive income tax applies to above normal returns such as 
economic rents. Firms are allowed to deduct not only interest on debt but 
also a normal, risk-free return on equity (allowance for corporate equity, 
ACE). Households can deduct a normal return on all forms of savings (rate 
of return allowance, RRA).  
(ii)  Personal capital income taxation is complemented by a comprehensive life-
time wealth transfer tax levied on the recipient, including inheritances, and 
inter-vivos gifts and wealth transfers. 
(iii) A  separate,  source  based  corporate  income  tax  is  levied  in  addition  to 
residence based personal taxation of interest, dividends and capital gains; 
The corporate tax rate is left unchanged. 
(iv) Tax rates are realigned to avoid tax arbitrage. In each income tax bracket, 
reduced  rates  apply  to  dividends  and  capital  gains  earned  on  corporate 
shareholdings,  reflecting  corporate  tax  already  paid.  At  the  margin,  the 
same cumulative tax applies to different forms of income such as wages, 
earnings of self-employed and sole proprietorships, and corporate income. 
Tax By Design thus reflects several key decisions. The first is to move to a 
largely  consumption  based  tax  system  that  eliminates  tax  distortions  against 
savings and investment by avoiding the over-proportionate taxation of deferred 
consumption. This is probably the most powerful pro growth feature of the reform 
proposal. Second, the corporate tax should not be abolished, and its rate should not 
be  changed.  Its  key  justification  is  to  serve  as  a  backstop  to  personal  income 
taxation  and  to  tax  location  specific  economic  rents  at  source.  With  purely 
residence based personal capital income taxation,  for example,  it would not be 
possible to tax the local earnings of foreign owned companies. Third, the presence 
of a corporate tax then dictates adjustments of personal taxation of dividends and 
capital gains to prevent tax arbitrage and to ensure that different forms of income 
are subject to the same overall tax burden. 
(i) Personal Capital Income Taxation 
In my view, the most radical aspect of Tax by Design is the zero tax on a normal 
risk-free  return  to  personal  capital  income.  For  this  reason,  interest  on  bank 
deposits and building society accounts are left untaxed altogether, probably yet 
another  element  towards  a  simpler  tax  code.  The  return  on  risky  equity  or  on 
business bonds is higher and exceeds the normal return by a risk-premium. The CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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normal return remains tax free on account of a rate of return allowance, RRA for 
short (see Sorensen, 2005, for an analysis).
2 Given complete loss offset and carry 
forward of unused allowances with interest, as is proposed in  Tax By Design, the 
tax on this excess return is not harmful with respect to savings, risk-taking and 
portfolio  composition.  It  also  avoids  the  lock-in  effect  associated  with  current 
practice of capital gains taxation based on the realization principle, and it avoids 
the distortive effect of taxing nominal interest reflecting inflation rather than a real 
return.  These  must  be  considered  important  advantages.  The  administrative 
difficulties  of  running  the  RRA  system  are  probably  comparable  to  the 
administration and compliance costs of current practice of capital gains taxation. 
Leaving the normal return on savings untaxed, Tax By Design is considerably 
more radical than other reform proposals. Zero taxation of personal capital income 
is not undisputed in the academic literature. While classical results support zero 
taxation, there are recent theoretical arguments recommending a positive capital 
income tax, see Auerbach (2008). While the chapter by Banks and Diamond (2010) 
in the background studies emphasized all in all the need for a positive tax rate, 
Robert  Hall's  discussion  of  this  chapter  forcefully  argued  for  a  zero  rate.  The 
Mirrlees  committee  discussed  existing  arguments  for  positive  capital  income 
taxation but interpreted them as not being strong and robust enough to justify a 
deviation from zero taxation. Maybe in light of theoretical arguments in favour of a 
positive rate, or because of the expected, substantial loss in tax revenue from not 
taxing the normal return on financial wealth in a rich economy, or because of the 
potentially  negative  distributional  effects  of  eliminating  interest  taxation,  other 
prominent reform proposals such as the U.S. President's Advisory Panel of Federal 
Tax Reform (2006), for example, opted for a positive tax rate. The Growth and 
Investment Tax proposal of the President's Panel suggested a cash-flow tax at the 
firm level with an add-on personal capital income tax, applied at a flat rate on 
dividends, capital gains and interest.  
Our own tax reform proposal for Switzerland (see Keuschnigg and Dietz, 2007) 
combines an ACE tax (allowance for corporate equity) on the firm level with a flat 
tax rate on personal capital income together with progressive wage taxation. It is 
thus a growth oriented version of a dual income tax. With much the same effect as 
in Tax By Design, tax rates are realigned in ways that should prevent tax arbitrage 
and  reclassification  of  labour  into  capital  income.  Suppose  the  top  rate  of  the 
progressive wage tax is tL, while the proportional rates on corporate profits and 
personal  capital  income  are  tI  and  tS.  Rates  are  set  to  satisfy  the  restriction 
                                                       
2 Suppose the normal return were 3% in nominal terms and a person owns an asset 
worth 100 Euros. If she received interest or dividends of 5%, she would a 3% RRA and add 
only 2 Euros to her taxable income. If the asset generated zero dividends, she would deduct 
a loss of 3 Euros due to RRA, to be offset with other taxable income or, if unused, carried 
forward with interest. CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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(1−tI)(1−tS)=(1−tL). An entrepreneur's personal contribution to the firm’s earnings 
adds to profits and shows up as a supernormal return on capital. Since it results 
from the entrepreneur’s personal effort rather than capital, it does not qualify for an 
ACE deduction. If the entrepreneur declares profit income, the earnings from her 
labour input get double taxed, first at the company level at a rate tI and then at the 
personal level at a rate tS. When an entrepreneur in the top tax bracket claims a 
managerial wage that reduces one by one her reported profit, she is subject to the 
top rate tL, leaving net earnings 1−tL. By definition, the cumulative tax burden is 
the  same.  If  the  entrepreneur’s  income  falls  into  a  lower  tax  bracket,  she  can 
always obtain the firm’s income in terms of a wage and thereby avoid a too high 
tax  burden  on  profits.  This  eliminates  the  incentives  for  tax  arbitrage  by 
misclassification of owners’ wages as capital income and vice versa. 
The dual income tax proposed for Switzerland includes an explicit decision to 
tax capital income on the personal level at a low, but positive proportional rate. 
This  is  rationalized  mainly  with  distributional  arguments.
3  In reality, savings, 
financial wealth and capital income taxes are very much concentrated in the richer 
part of the population. A substantial part of low income people basically have no 
savings at all,  beyond the claims accumulated within the old age social security 
scheme.  Low  income  groups  would  not  be  able  to  benefit from  eliminating 
intertemporal distortions, the welfare gains would concentrate in the upper income 
groups.  This  makes  a  life -time  transfer  tax  including  systematic  taxation  of 
bequests all the more important which is, indeed, a central pillar of the  Tax By 
Design proposal. However, there is a widespread and increasing unpopularity of 
bequest taxes (see Kay's comment on Banks and Diamond, 2010, p. 658). One 
should  add  that  bequest  taxation  usually  allows  for  large  exemptions  and 
substantially reduced and even zero rates for close family members. Finally, like all 
proposals  for  moving  to  a  consumption  based  tax  system,  Tax  By  Design  is 
expected  to  substantially  stimulate  capital  accumulation  and  growth  (to  be 
discussed  below).  Since  there  is  quite  some  evidence  for  capital  skill 
complementarity in production, one might expect that this will magnify income 
inequality by inducing a spread in the wage distribution which again favours the 
higher earnings groups where financial wealth is concentrated. For these reasons, 
our own proposal favours a moderate, flat, add on personal capital income tax. 
                                                       
3 However, Hubbard (2005) denies that a consumption based tax is more regressive than 
income tax. Low income people mainly hold assets with a normal return which is not taxed 
under a consumption based system. High income groups mainly save in assets with above 
average returns including a premium on risk-bearing and entrepreneurship. This 'excess 
return' would be taxed both by a conventional income tax and a consumption based system. CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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(ii) Corporate Income Taxation 
There seems more unanimity that the normal return on investment, as opposed 
to  savings,  should  remain  tax  free  although  there  are  rivalling  concepts  of 
achieving  this.  The  main  alternatives  are  cash-flow  and  ACE  taxes.  Cash-flow 
taxes were early on advertised by the Meade committee (Meade, 1978) and allow 
for  a  full  upfront  deduction  of  investment  expenses  in  place  of  normal  tax 
depreciation but deny any deduction of financing costs, neither interest on business 
debt nor an opportunity cost of equity.
4 An ACE system was early on analyzed by 
Boadway and Bruce (1984) and introduced in the political debate by the  Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (1990). An ACE tax denies any upfront investment deduction 
and, instead, allows deduction of interest on debt as well as a normal return on  
equity, together with normal tax depreciation of capital.  Hence, there are several 
alternatives for a system that is largely neutral with respect to intensive investment 
and capital structure choice. All exempt from tax the normal return to capital and 
effectively tax only rents and other 'excess' returns.  
The Mirrlees committee opted for  an ACE system while the U.S. President's 
Panel  instead opted for a cash -flow tax.  These different choices are somewhat 
surprising since the academic literature has shown  that ACE and cash -flow tax 
systems are equivalent on a basic level  (see Bond and Devereux, 1995 and 2003). 
This equivalence requires that both tax systems raise the same present value of tax 
revenue and, for this to be possible, the ACE tax must be applied with a higher tax 
rate since the tax base is smaller.
5 If investment could only respond on the intensive 
margin, a higher rate would not be damaging since the effective marginal tax rate is 
zero  with an ACE tax , independent of the  statutory  tax rate, lea ding to the 
equivalence of these alternative two approaches in the classical case where no other 
investment margins are relevant.   However, if the statutory tax rate cannot be 
changed for other reasons, as is argued in Tax By Design, an ACE tax tends to give 
up more tax revenue than a cash-flow system. Consequently, more of the required 
tax revenue must be raised with other distorting taxes. Presumably, raising other 
taxes  might  become  easier  when  they  are  reformed  as  in  Tax  By  Design.  For 
example, in eliminating exemptions and zero rating, the VAT should become much 
                                                       
4 This holds true for the R-base tax. Another variant is the S-base cash-flow tax which 
differs in the treatment of debt. Interest on debt remains deductible but new debt is added 
and repayment of existing debt is subtracted from the tax base. 
5  Ignoring  other  details,  investment  spending  in  a  stationary  equilibrium  would  be 
I=(g+d)K where K is the capital stock, g the growth rate and d the depreciation rate. Using 
a risk-free interest i, the deduction under an ACE tax would be (i+d)K. Since i>g in a 
dynamically  efficient  economy,  the  ACE  tax  base  tends  to  be  smaller.  This  insight  is 
replicated in simulation exercises  with a detailed  model  that  fully takes  account of the 
entire transition, see Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2011). CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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more of a pure consumption tax and should be much less distorting, implying that 
government, for efficiency reasons, should use this tax source to a larger extent. 
Before discussing the specific choices of Tax By Design in taxing the returns to 
investment, it is useful to shortly review the key behavioural margins of aggregate, 
national investment and the tax measures that relate to it (see Sorensen, 2004). The 
first margin is intensive investment relating to the marginal variation of investment 
choices and the size of firms. Intensive investment is driven by the user cost of 
capital which is pushed up by a high EMTR (effective marginal tax rate). An ACE 
tax implies a zero EMTR and, thus, has no impact on the user cost and on intensive 
investment which establishes the 'investment neutrality' of the concept. The second 
margin is extensive investment, referring to the location decisions of internationally 
mobile firms and to entry and exit of new entrepreneurial firms. These discrete 
investment choices determine the number of firms in an economy and are driven by 
the total tax burden per firm, as measured by the EATR (effective average tax rate). 
Since an ACE system taxes economic rents, it cannot reduce the EATR to zero and 
possibly  continues  to  distort  on  the  extensive  margin,  depending  on  how  the 
alternatives  of  these  discrete  investments  are  taxed.  Empirically,  the  extensive 
margin of investment seems to be more tax sensitive than investment driven by the 
usual user cost channel (see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008, for a review). Noting 
also the rising importance of multinational investment, it has become much more 
important in an open economy to have a low average tax burden. Finally, firms 
adjust  on  other  margins  such  as  financing  patterns,  profit  shifting  and  other 
channels.  Incentives  for  profit  shifting  depend  on  the  difference  in  statutory 
national tax rates. Profit shifting by transfer pricing manipulations and the use of 
internal debt is increasingly undermining the tax base in high tax countries and 
eroding tax revenue. For example, the estimates of Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) 
imply that roughly 60% of the additional tax revenue generated by a unilateral 
increase in the corporate tax rate is lost again as a result of international profit 
shifting. The increasing dominance of multinational firms thus implies that national 
governments must keep the statutory corporate tax rate low in order to remain 
attractive as a location of multinational investment and protect the tax base against 
profit  shifting.  Devereux,  Griffith  and  Klemm  (2002)  argue  that  these  forces 
explain the downward trend in corporate tax rates as a result of international tax 
competition. 
In light of this evidence, a higher tax rate may not be possible due to profit 
shifting  by  multinationals.  It  thus  seems  quite  evident  that  an  increase  in  the 
corporate tax rate was not an option in Tax By Design in order to compensate for 
the  short-fall  in  tax  revenue  upon  exempting  the  normal  return  on  investment. 
Comparing ACE and cash-flow taxes with the same tax rate implies that the ACE 
tax gives up more tax revenue, to be financed by other presumably less damaging 
taxes  such  as  a  (reformed)  VAT.  However,  giving  up  more  tax  revenue  by 
accepting a smaller tax base also means that the EATR which is driving location CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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decisions of firms, will be lower under an ACE tax. Compared to a cash-flow tax 
with  the  same  statutory  rate,  the  ACE  tax  should  thus  be  more  successful  in 
attracting inbound FDI and containing outbound FDI which makes a country more 
competitive with respect to location decisions of firms. 
One could now summarize the anticipated long-run effects of introducing an 
ACE tax system combined with a RRA at the personal level as follows.  First, 
exempting  from  tax  the  normal  return  to  saving  should  strongly  stimulate  the 
volume of saving and remove distortions to portfolio composition. Second, the 
EMTR  on  investment,  both  at  the  personal  and  firm  level,  is  reduced  to  zero. 
Depending  on  the  size  of  initial  tax  distortions,  this  element  should  encourage 
capital accumulation and be a strong impetus to growth. Third, in symmetrically 
treating debt and equity at the personal and firm level, the new tax system would 
do away with a substantial tax bias for debt finance and would, thus, make firms 
financially  more  robust.
6  Although  there  is  quite  some  evidence  on  the  tax 
sensitivity of debt equity choice (e.g. Gordon and Lee, 2001,  Egger et al., 2010, 
comparing national firms with foreign owned subsidiaries ,  and others), less is 
known about the size of the cost imposed by the debt equity distortion and, 
therefore, about the size of the efficiency gain resulting from establishing debt 
neutrality.
7 One might think that the efficiency cost of tax induced, overl y high 
financial leverage of firms could be quite large, making these firms financially 
vulnerable to adverse shocks and send them into bankruptcy in times of economic 
crises.  Fourth,  introducing  an  ACE  tax  with  an  unchanged  tax  rate  should 
substantially reduce the EATR and strengthen a country's attractiveness as a 
location of multinational investment. If applied with the same statutory tax rate as 
an alternative cash-flow tax, the ACE system should provide a larger stimulus to 
the extensive margin of investment and should thus be more attractive to a small 
and open economy than a cash-flow tax. Fifth, in keeping the statutory corporate 
rate constant, Tax By Design will not change any incentives for profit shifting in 
the presence of international tax rate differences. 
An advantage of the ACE system is that it probably favours innovative growth 
companies relative to standard firms and could lead to larger aggregate investment 
and welfare than an equal yield cash-flow tax.
8 These firms have large investment 
                                                       
6 Both ACE and cash-flow taxes are largely neutral with respect to investment on the 
intensive margin and capital structure choice of firms. 
7 This is due to a lack of structural, micro-founded modelling of firms' financing choices 
in a way that could be included in a quantitative model, in place of the black box 
formulations of 'agency costs of debt' that are widely adopted in public finance. 
8 For more detailed analysis, see Keuschnigg and Ribi (2011) who compare ACE and 
cash-flow tax systems in an entrepreneurial economy with moral hazard and incentive 
problems. The advising and monitoring functions of active intermediaries, as discussed 
here, are analyzed in Tirole (2006, chapter 9), for example. CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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opportunities but are frequently finance constrained. A cash-flow tax provides tax 
relief  upfront  at  the  date  of  investment,  i.e.,  investment  costs  are  immediately 
expensed which reduces the need for external funds. In contrast, an ACE system 
allows interest deductions at a later stage when the returns to investment accrue. 
Although they need a larger credit when there is no investment subsidy, the lower 
tax  liability  strengthens  the  capacity  to  repay  external  funds.  Under  normal 
conditions, both taxes would still be equivalent even in the presence of financing 
constraints. However, young innovative firms must often rely on more active and 
more expensive sources of external financing, in addition to standard bank credit. 
In  such  cases,  the  success  of  investment  not  only  depends  on  effort  of  cash-
constrained  entrepreneurs  but  also  on  the  value  increasing  support  of  active 
intermediaries  such  as  venture  capitalists,  relationship  banks  etc.  In  these 
circumstances, entrepreneurs and active financiers must share the firm's profit and 
therefore only appropriate part of the return on their own effort while each party 
must bear all costs of effort, leading to underinvestment of effort  and physical 
capital. Efficient financial contracting is often prevented by liquidity constraints on 
entrepreneurs.  In  this  case,  the  timing  of  tax  payments  becomes  important. 
Compared to cash-flow taxes, an ACE system leads to a low tax burden at the late 
return stage which strengthens the reward to effort of both the entrepreneur and 
active financiers. Consequently, investment and welfare is higher with an ACE tax 
compared to an equal yield cash-flow tax. 
The  ACE  might  favour  innovative,  finance  constrained  firms  also  by  an 
alternative mechanism due to firm heterogeneity. Instead of adding value to firms, 
financial intermediaries might boost pledgeable income and raise debt capacity by 
monitoring. Monitoring capital is more expensive, leads to larger financing costs 
and is, thus, demanded only by constrained firms which might otherwise not get 
funding.  Other  firms  exclusively  rely  on  cheaper  standard  credit.  An  ACE  tax 
favours constrained growth companies when these firms are in need of monitoring 
capital and, thus, generate larger interest deductions per unit of capital. Compared 
to  an  equal  yield  cash-flow  tax,  an  ACE  system  thereby  redistributes  from 
unconstrained  towards  constrained  firms  and  relaxes  financing  constraints  on 
investments that earn an excess return on capital. This mechanism again implies 
that  aggregate  investment  and  welfare  is  higher  under  an  ACE  tax.  These 
advantages of the ACE system might support the expansion of the most dynamic 
parts of the business sector, driven by innovative growth companies with large and 
not fully exploited investment opportunities. 
Yet  another  advantage  of  the  postponed  tax  burden  under  an  ACE  system 
relates to transitional problems. A growth oriented tax reform starts a phase of high 
transitional growth with high rates of investment in the early adjustment period. 
When  moving  to  a  cash-flow  tax,  tax  revenue  is  expected  to  decline  quite 
dramatically in the first few periods where investment spending is unusually high 
compared to  normal  levels  on a  balanced  growth path. To finance  government CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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spending, policy would have to resort to other distorting taxes or take up more 
public debt to smooth tax revenue. It might be politically very difficult to push 
through a fundamental tax reform if the consequences are so disadvantageous in 
the short-run. Moving to an ACE system tends to involve a much smaller short-run 
revenue loss since the deductions for the cost of finance do not instantaneously 
increase by the same amount. In consequence, the short-run loss in revenue should 
be substantially smaller under an ACE tax, making it much easier to introduce it.
9 
At least in the realm of capital income taxation, Tax By Design aims to achieve 
the greatest possible tax neutrality with respect to economic decisions, and to avoid 
tax arbitrage opportunities which could be costly in terms of tax revenue. Avoiding 
tax arbitrage puts a restriction on the structure of tax rates so that the cumulative 
tax burden remains unchanged at the margin, irrespective in which form income is 
earned. This has been a problem of dual income taxes as practiced in some of the 
Nordic countries where many individuals were able to partly escape a high wage 
tax burden by earning the income from the same activity as a self-employed or 
owner of a small business. Such tax avoidance threatens the wage tax base and can 
be costly in terms of tax revenue. To prevent tax arbitrage, the same activity must 
be taxed in the same way, irrespective of whether it is carried out as an employee, 
as a self-employed in a sole proprietorship, or as a closely held corporation paying 
dividends and capital gains instead of (managerial) wages.  
To  avoid  tax  arbitrage,  alternative  forms  of  income  generated  by  the  same 
activity  must  bear  the  same  cumulative  tax  burden  at  the  margin  (see  also 
Keuschnigg and Dietz, 2007, p. 194, and the discussion in subsection 2i above). 
Tax By Design leaves a normal return untaxed by means of an RRA while 'excess 
returns' are taxed under a stepwise progressive income tax schedule. In case of 
dividends and capital gains earned on shares in corporations, the tax rate in each 
income bracket is reduced by an amount that reflects corporation tax paid by the 
firm. This structuring of tax rates prevents tax avoidance by reclassifying income. 
The  total  tax  liability  remains  unchanged,  irrespective  of  whether  income  is 
received as a wage of an employee, as a profit income of a sole proprietorship, or 
as a distributed dividend of a small closely held corporation. Importantly, Tax By 
Design proposes a full integration of social insurance contributions into the income 
tax schedule since different contribution rates and benefit rules for workers, self-
employed  persons  and  manager  owners  of  small  corporations  can  also  lead  to 
substantial distortions of the choice of income type and organizational form. 
The realignment of tax rates on distributed corporate profits leaves a degree of 
freedom that allows for some flexibility of adjusting the tax system to globalization 
pressures. Should international tax competition require an even lower corporate tax 
                                                       
9 See the computational analysis of Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2011), comparing 
transition problems when moving to ACE and variants of cash-flow taxes. CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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rate, a higher tax rate on dividends and capital gains would automatically apply at 
the personal level. A lower corporate tax rate would reduce incentives for profit 
shifting and strengthen the country as a location of multinational investment. The 
higher  taxation  of  dividends  and  capital  gains,  in  contrast,  would  largely  be 
irrelevant for investment decisions for multinational companies whose shares are 
internationally traded. The systematic application of RRA and ACE allowances 
also  implies  a  zero  EMTR  independent  of  the  composition  of  dividend  and 
corporate taxes. Hence, investment of nationally operating, mostly smaller firms 
would not be adversely affected as well.  
3.  Quantification 
Implementing Tax By Design would imply a large change in the tax system and 
may  be  seriously  considered  only  if  significant  net  economic  gains  are  to  be 
expected with some reliability. The key problem is that budgetary and adjustment 
costs tend to show up rather soon, are highly visible, and can be reasonably well 
predicted. The gains from reduced distortions and better incentives, in contrast, 
materialize only after a prolonged period of behavioural adjustment and are much 
less  certain,  at  least  in  the  perception  of  the  public.  This  timing  holds  true  in 
particular in the realm of corporate and capital income taxation, as wealth and 
capital accumulation driven by savings and investment is a rather slow process. 
Given  the  short  time  horizon  of  political  decisions,  this  timing  seems  a  major 
obstacle to reform.  
Quantification  is  important  to  give  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  potential 
gains and costs of reform in terms of efficiency and distribution. Given the large 
budgetary repercussions and the significant changes in incentives for investment, 
savings  and  aggregate  labour  supply,  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model  is 
required. How would a model have to look like for a rough meaningful evaluation? 
There  are  a  number  of  computational  models  with  a  relatively  rich  economic 
structure that could go a long way to capture the most important efficiency gains 
and distributional implications of implementing such a reform. One of the most 
refined  models  is  probably  the  one  applied  by  Altig  et  al.  (2001)  to  analyze 
fundamental income tax proposals in the U.S. The model includes 55 overlapping 
generations together with 12 earnings groups in each generation. Investment and 
savings are derived from forward looking optimization. It includes labour supply at 
the intensive margin and endogenously determined bequests driven by a 'joy of 
giving' motive. Rich as it is, it nevertheless misses several elements that would be 
important in capturing key economic channels that are importantly addressed in 
Tax By Design. The following is a possibly incomplete list of model elements that 
would be needed in my view to capture key aspects of Tax By Design: CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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  Decomposition  of  the  business  sector  into  locally  operating  and 
multinational companies and including location decisions of multinational 
firms as well as profit shifting. 
  Portfolio choice over assets with a normal return and other assets earning 
an excess return, reflecting a reward to risk-taking or economic rents. The 
level of savings should be driven by the normal return which remains tax 
free on account of the RRA allowance. There should be tax revenue from 
taxation of assets with an excess return.  
  Adding a margin of discrete labour supply such as a participation decision 
and search unemployment to capture the improved incentives for extensive 
labour supply deriving from the reform of life-time earnings. 
  Extending the modelling of a progressive tax system by introducing RRA 
and  ACE  deductions  and introducing  a  more  detailed  modelling  of  the 
social security system. 
  Modelling of public debt and carry forward of unused allowances with 
interest to analyze alternative transition strategies. 
Clearly, capturing all these aspects in a single and reasonably robust model is a 
daunting  task.  Probably  there  will  be  separate  analyses  focussing  on  different 
isolated aspects of the reform proposal, if at all. The simulation results in Altig et 
al. (2001) on alternative tax reforms, including a proportional consumption tax, 
show potentially significant long-run income gains for some reforms. However, the 
specific transition policy is crucial. Providing transition relief and protecting poor 
and initial older groups can substantially reduce long-run gains. 
Our  own  analysis  in  Keuschnigg  and  Keuschnigg  (2011)  simulates  the 
consequences  of  introducing  an  ACE  tax  and  variants  of  cash-flow  taxes  in 
Germany,  using  an  overlapping  generations  model  featuring  savings  and 
investment  in  an  open  economy,  intensive  and  extensive  labour  supply  with 
equilibrium unemployment and a detailed modelling of capital income taxation. 
Our  analysis  emphasizes  the  importance  of  transition  policies  to  avoid  large 
windfall gains to the owners of old capital (see Kaplow, 2008, on this point, which 
is somewhat neglected in the conclusions of Tax By Design, see chapter 20) and to 
ensure a slow rather than an abrupt, instantaneous decline in corporate tax revenue. 
The  comparison  of  the  ACE  tax  with  cash-flow  taxes  showed  that  the  initial 
decline in tax revenue is much smaller under ACE which is also praised as an 
advantage  in  the  Tax  By  Design  report.  However,  the  revenue  loss  remains 
significant.  Raising  wage  taxes  or  VAT  has  adverse  consequences  for  labour 
market performance, leading to a considerable income loss in the short-run before 
the beneficial effects of induced capital accumulation set in. Deficit financing to 
avoid an increase in other taxes would prevent the short-run decline in income but 
would  reduce  the  long-run  gains  of  the  reform  since  higher  future  taxes  are CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG 
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required to pay for interest on the higher level of public debt. Increased public debt 
is probably also not a realistic political option, given the high levels of debt that 
most countries have inherited from the last economic crisis. 
Our preferred transition policy is a system of 'delayed deductions' where firms 
are not allowed to immediately consume all tax allowances under the new system, 
thereby strengthening short-run corporate tax revenue. Firms are forced to carry 
forward with interest and deduct unused allowances in the future where tax revenue 
is stronger on account of induced growth effects. Quite interestingly, this system 
works much like the carry forward with interest of unused allowances in the RRA 
system suggested in  Tax By Design, except that in our analysis of a transition 
policy, the carry forward would be mandatory over a prolonged period. In shifting 
tax revenue from the future to the present, our transition policy promises not only 
future income gains but also improves economic performance immediately after 
reform. Such a mechanism might thus be helpful in overcoming political obstacles 
to fundamental tax reform. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
Tax By Design is the result of a gigantic, academic project undertaken by a most 
reputed editorial team in the top league of economic research. The report draws on 
a large number of background studies by the most established researchers in each 
field. It synthesizes modern economic theory and empirical evidence from a large 
number of diverse areas of specialization, ranging from location decisions of firms, 
household bequest behaviour to labour market behaviour of families. Obviously, 
not all economists will draw exactly the same policy conclusions and not all might 
weigh  the  empirical  evidence  in  the  same  way  as  the  committee  did. 
Notwithstanding this, I believe that Tax By Design is an impressive achievement in 
terms of logic and internal consistency which is expected to yield a long lasting 
impact  on  the  policy  community,  should  inspire  new  research  on  the  various 
aspects of the reform proposal for a new tax system, and should initiate quantitative 
research to evaluate the potential gains and distributional effects of implementing 
such a system.  
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